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This paper demonstrates that levels of entrepreneurship can be greatly affected by the general 
policy environment.  Using a state-level panel, we estimate the effects of several policy variables 
on rates of entrepreneurship and find that bankruptcy exemptions, corporate tax rates, and the 
level of the minimum wage all affect a state’s rate of entrepreneurship.  For the median state, 
these policies reduced the level of entrepreneurship by 10.5 percent.  Much of the geographic 
pattern of entrepreneurship can be explained by policy differences:  The low-entrepreneurship 
states of the Great Lakes and the South tend to have relatively unfriendly policy environments, 
and the high-entrepreneurship states of the West tend to have relatively friendly policies.  On the 
other hand, although New England states tend to have relatively unfriendly policy environments, 
they also tend to have high rates of entrepreneurship.   
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  Entrepreneurship is often viewed as a catalyst for economic growth.  Through innovation, 
hard work, and a willingness to accept financial risk, the entrepreneur takes advantage of 
previously undiscovered opportunities for arbitrage and profit (Kirzner, 1997).
1  This quest for 
profit, and the possibility of personal and financial failure, aid in ensuring that an economy’s 
resources are used efficiently.  Successful entrepreneurs provide employment opportunities to 
others, generate innovation, spur economic growth, and contribute to state and local governments 
in the form of tax revenue.
2  Because of this perception of the benefits generated by 
entrepreneurship, a large literature has focused on the factors that influence the decision of an 
individual to become an entrepreneur and the conditions under which entrepreneurship prospers. 
  Previous research on entrepreneurship has examined the roles of various demographic, 
human capital, and financial considerations in the decision to become an entrepreneur.  Rees and 
Shah (1986), Gill (1988), and Hamilton (2000) stressed the importance of the earnings 
differential between entrepreneurship and paid employment.  Liquidity constraints on 
entrepreneurship were addressed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), 
and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a, 1994b).  Personal and job satisfaction differentials between 
entrepreneurship and paid employment have been addressed in Taylor (1996), Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1998), and Blanchflower (2000).  In addition, Blanchflower et al. (2001), Georgellis 
and Wall (2000a), and Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven (2004) examined the importance of social 
                                                 
1 Blanchflower (2004) casts doubt on this supposition, finding a negative relationship between a country’s growth 
and its rate of self employment. 
2 Gwartney et al. (2004) and Kreft and Sobel (2005). 
  1factors, or latent entrepreneurship, in explaining differences in entrepreneurship across countries 
and regions, respectively.   
  This paper examines the influence of government policy on rates of entrepreneurship 
across U.S. states, a topic that has been receiving increasing attention.  Recent research has 
explored the influence of several state-level policies on entrepreneurship, such as personal-
income tax rates, bank deregulation, and bankruptcy laws.
3  We extend this literature by 
considering other policies, such as corporate-income tax rates and state minimum wages.  
Furthermore, the flexibility of our empirical model accounts for potential non-linearities between 
the policy variables and the rate of entrepreneurship in a state.   
  We obtain estimates of the effects of government policies on entrepreneurship by 
exploiting the differences in entrepreneurship and policies across the 50 U.S. states during the 
1990s.  Throughout, we define the rate of entrepreneurship as the share of the working age 
population (16-64) who are proprietors.  We exclude farm proprietors, as does previous research, 
on the basis that the decision to become a farm proprietor depends upon different factors than the 
decision to become a non-farm proprietor.  As summarized by Table 1, there were substantial 
differences in state rates of entrepreneurship at the beginning and the end of the period.  For 
example, in 1990 there were two states—Mississippi and South Carolina—whose rates of 
entrepreneurship were less than half that of Alaska, the most entrepreneurial state.  The decade 
saw significant upward movement in entrepreneurship:  The average of state rates of 
                                                 
3 In addition, Kreft and Sobel (2005) looked more broadly at the effect of economic freedom, which is measured by 
an index constructed from a list of variables indicating the burden of government.  
  2entrepreneurship went from 13.5 in 1990 to 15.8 in 2000 and all but two states saw higher rates 
of entrepreneurship in 2000 than in 1990.   
  One of our objectives is to determine whether the geographic pattern of entrepreneurship 
illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 is related to the geographic pattern of policy environments.  In 
1990 and 2000, New England and the West were the most entrepreneurial regions, with the 
South and Great Lakes regions lagging.  The geographic pattern of changes in entrepreneurship 
is less clear than the difference in the levels of entrepreneurship (Figure 3).  Although some of 
the already- entrepreneurial states in New England and the West saw the largest increases in 
entrepreneurship, some of the lagging states, particularly in the South, also saw large increases.   
 
II. The Empirical Model 
  Our empirical model extends that of Georgellis and Wall (2000a) by adding a vector of 
explanatory variables that controls for the policy environment: 
. it t i it E ′ ′ ′ (1)                  +τ + + + α = it it it G γ Z θ X β +ε
In equation (1), the dependent variable Eit is the rate of entrepreneurship in state i during year t.  
The parameter   denotes state fixed effects and τ i α t denotes year effects.  The vector Xit 
measures average demographic characteristics, and the vector Zit measures business conditions.  
The policy environment is captured by the vector of policy variables, Git.  Finally,  is the error 
term.  Data sources and summary statistics for all variables used in the estimation are provided in 
appendix Tables 1A and 2A. 
it ε
  3  The demographic variables in Xit measure the age, gender, and racial compositions of 
state employment, categories across which rates of self-employment differ a great deal 
(Georgellis and Wall, 2000b).  For example, men are nearly twice as likely as women to be self-
employed, and blacks are less than one-third as likely to be self-employed as whites or Asians.  
Our vector of business conditions, Zit, includes the state’s unemployment rate, per capita real 
income, industry employment shares, real proprietor’s wage, per capita real wealth (as proxied 
by dividends, interest, and rent), and the real median house price weighted by the rate of home 
ownership.  These last two variables control for differences in the levels of assets that the 
average person has to support an entrepreneurial venture.    
  Care needs to be taken when interpreting the estimated coefficients for the variables in 
Xit and Zit.  These variables might simultaneously measure differences across states in the supply 
of entrepreneurs and the demand for the products that are more likely to be produced by 
entrepreneurs.  For one example, over 10 percent of self-employed women in 1997 were in the 
child-care business, while virtually no men were (Georgellis and Wall, 2000b).  On the one hand, 
a state with a relatively high share of females might have a relatively high supply of child-care 
providers, and therefore have more self-employed women.  On the other hand, the state also has 
relatively more women demanding child-care services, thereby making the state a relatively 
lucrative market for self-employed child-care providers.  Therefore, because supply and demand 
cannot be separated by the variables in Xit and Zit, we include them only as controls and do not 
interpret their coefficients. 
  4  An exception to this is the unemployment rate, which is a measure of the health of a 
state’s economy.  A low unemployment rate suggests relatively low risks and high returns for 
entrepreneurial ventures, thereby pulling a higher share of the population into entrepreneurship.  
In Parker (1996), however, a high unemployment rate indicates the number of people with 
limited opportunities for wage-and-salary employment who might be pushed into self-
employment out of necessity.  Thus, the sign of the coefficient on the unemployment rate has 
been interpreted as a measure of the relative strengths of the pull and push effects of the 
unemployment rate.   
 
III. The Policy Environment 
  The variables of greatest interest in this paper are the four measures of state policy in the 
vector of policy variables, Git.  This vector includes measures of bankruptcy laws, personal-
income taxes, corporate-income taxes, and the minimum wage. 
A. Homestead Exemption 
  State bankruptcy laws allow those filing for personal bankruptcy to exempt some of their 
assets and income from creditors.  The exemptions can include some or all of the value of the 
person’s home, pension, and a host of other assets.  Because an entrepreneur’s home is likely to 
be his or her most valuable asset, recent studies have focused on the possibility of a link between 
the homestead exemption and levels of entrepreneurship (Berkowitz and White, 2004; Fan and 
White, 2003; Georgellis and Wall, 2006).  These studies have posited two opposing effects.  The 
first effect arises because a potential entrepreneur views the level of the homestead exemption as 
  5insurance against the failure of an entrepreneurial venture.  If one’s home is not subject to 
distribution to creditors, a potential entrepreneur is more likely to take on the increased risk of 
being an entrepreneur instead of being a wage-and-salary employee.  In addition to this wealth-
insurance effect, however, the homestead exemption creates a credit-access effect.  Banks and 
other creditors are aware of bankruptcy exemptions and adjust the availability of credit 
accordingly.  Thus, by making credit more difficult to come by, the homestead exemption might 
reduce the number of entrepreneurs. 
  Our homestead exemption rate is a measure of the percentage of the average person’s 
homestead that would be protected from creditors in the event of personal bankruptcy.  In 
creating the variable, we need to account for several state-level differences in the treatment of 
homesteads during bankruptcy proceedings.  The primary source of these differences is the 
homestead exemption—the amount of a home’s value that is exempt from bankruptcy 
proceedings.  Cross-state differences in the homestead exemption are summarized in the first 
data column of Table 2.  These differences are significant:  In 1997, six states did not allow for 
any amount of the value of a person’s home to be exempt from distribution to creditors, but eight 
other states placed no limit on the amount that could be exempted.   
  The homestead exemption rate is constructed to allow also for the fact that some states 
permit filers to use the federal exemption level and that some states allow married filers to 
double the exemption level.
4  In addition, because our variable is meant to capture the exemption 
that the average person in a state might face, we control for differences in the average house 
                                                 
4 The federal homestead exemption was $15,000 in 1997. 
  6price and in home ownership rates.
5  As in Georgellis and Wall (2006), we also consider the 
square and cube of the homestead exemption rate to control for the potential non-linearities 
resulting from the opposing wealth-insurance and credit-access effects.  
B. Personal-Income Tax 
  Of the policy variables that we consider, the personal-income tax is the one that has 
received the most attention in the literature.  For the most part, the effect of personal-income tax 
rates on entrepreneurship has been expected to be negative—a labor-supply effect—although 
most studies have found a positive relationship.
6  The usual explanation for this unexpected 
result is a tax-avoidance effect arising from the observation that being an entrepreneur affords 
greater opportunity for tax avoidance than does wage-and-salary employment.  Georgellis and 
Wall (2006) allow for a non-linear relationship between personal-income tax rates and 
entrepreneurship and find that the labor-supply effect dominates at low tax rates while the tax-
avoidance effect dominates at higher tax rates.
7
   While most studies have focused on the level of personal-income taxes, other studies 
have found that the structure of personal-income tax systems can affect levels of 
                                                 
5 To construct the homestead exemption rate, we took the state exemption level or, if the state allows the federal 
option, the maximum of the state and federal exemption levels.  If this exemption level was greater than the average 
house price in the state, we used the average house price instead.  We then multiplied this by the state’s 
homeownership rate and, if the state allows married householders to double the exemption, we multiplied this by 1 
plus the state’s share of households in which both spouses reside together.  The homestead exemption rate is this 
result divided by the average house price. 
6 Long (1982a, 1982b), Evans and Leighton (1989), Blau (1987), Parker (1996), Schuetze (2000), Gentry and 
Hubbard (2000), Bruce and Mohsin (2003), and Fan and White (2003).  See Schuetze and Bruce (2004) for a survey. 
7 Cullen and Gordon (2002) offer a different explanation for the positive relationship.  They argue that the tax 
system provides a net subsidy to risk-taking because entrepreneurs have the option of whether or not to incorporate 
their business.  Because personal-income tax rates are higher than corporate rates, an entrepreneur facing losses 
would prefer to face personal-income tax rates so that the deduction of the losses against other income would have 
greater value.  An increase in personal-income tax rates makes this option more valuable and makes it more likely 
that someone would choose to become an entrepreneur. 
  7entrepreneurship.  Bruce (2000), for example, notes that the tax system treats self-employment 
and wage-and-salary earnings differently.  Also, Bruce et al. (2004) and Gentry and Hubbard 
(2000) find that the progressivity of personal-income taxes can be important. 
  As the second data column of Table 2 illustrates, states differ a great deal in their 
tendency to use income taxes to generate revenue.  Nine states had no income tax in 1997, while 
10 states had their highest statutory marginal tax rate set at 8 percent or higher.   
  Our personal-income tax variable is the maximum marginal tax rate (state plus federal) as 
generated by the NBER’s TAXSIM model.  Although few people actually face the maximum 
marginal tax rate, it should be strongly correlated with the marginal tax rate that the average 
person faces.  As in Georgellis and Wall (2006), we include both the level and the square of the 
maximum marginal personal-income tax rate to capture the competing effects of the tax rate on 
labor effort and tax avoidance. 
C. Corporate-Income Tax 
  A corporation is a separate legal entity that is distinct from the entrepreneur.  Unlike an 
unincorporated entrepreneur, who is personally liable for the assets and liabilities of running a 
business, an incorporated entrepreneur’s liability is limited to the assets of the corporation.  In 
addition, because potential buyers will also have limited liability for the actions of the seller, 
incorporation might increase the market value of a business.  Incorporation might make it easier 
for an entrepreneur to raise investment capital, primarily because it allows an entrepreneur to 
issue shares of stock.   
  8  Higher rates of corporate-income tax mean that some entrepreneurs will choose to not 
incorporate, although they might still be unincorporated entrepreneurs.  For some entrepreneurial 
ventures, however, incorporation might be the only viable choice, perhaps because they require 
relatively large amounts of capital or because the ventures are relatively risky.  These ventures 
might not be started if corporate-income tax rates are too high.  Even the number of 
unincorporated entrepreneurs can be affected by the rate of corporate-income tax because future 
incorporation might be in the plans when an entrepreneurial venture grows.  High corporate-
income tax rates reduce future profitability and might dissuade some potential entrepreneurs 
from becoming unincorporated entrepreneurs. 
  In addition to the negative effects outlined above, higher corporate-income tax rates 
might have a positive effect on the number of entrepreneurs.  Because the corporate-income tax 
is levied on all corporations, whether they are run by entrepreneurs or not, the suppressing effect 
of corporate taxes might reduce the number of wage-and-salary employment opportunities at 
corporations.  In this way, high corporate-income tax rates might have the effect of pushing 
people out of their jobs as wage-and-salary employees and into entrepreneurship.  When 
interpreting our estimates, we should keep in mind that this effect, while increasing the number 
of entrepreneurs, reflects the overall deleterious effects of overly high tax rates. 
  The rates at which states tax the income of corporations (see Table 2) are very different.  
Five states, none of which taxed personal income in 1997, also had no tax on corporate income.  
For 11 states, on the other hand, the top tax rate was 9 percent or higher.  Our corporate-income 
  9tax variable is the maximum statutory state corporate-income tax rate.  We use a quadratic 
specification to capture the possibility of the two opposing effects of corporate-income tax rates.  
D. Minimum Wage  
  On average, businesses run by entrepreneurs are more likely than other businesses to see 
their hiring decisions affected by the minimum wage.  Large shares of entrepreneurs are in 
industries that rely on low-wage workers:  Four of the top five industry categories in terms of the 
percentages of workers earning the minimum wage or below account for about one-third of self-
employed men and about one-half of self-employed women.
8  For such businesses, an increase 
in the minimum wage would make it more difficult for some portion of them to remain 
profitable.  The fact that the federal minimum wage is set at the same level for all states makes it 
more problematic for entrepreneurs in low-productivity states.  Although the minimum wage is 
largely uniform across the country, employers in low-productivity states have a more difficult 
time finding workers whose productivity justifies being paid the minimum wage.  Because of 
this, our minimum wage variable is the statutory minimum wage relative to the average 
productivity of labor in the state, as measured by per employee Gross State Product (GSP) per 
hour.
9   
  It is worth noting that there substantial variations in both the numerator and the 
denominator of our relative minimum wage variable.  Clearly, because employment and GSP 
differ greatly across states and change frequently over time, movements in the denominator will 
                                                 
8 Retail; business, auto, and repair services; personal services, and entertainment and recreation (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers; Georgellis and Wall, 2000b). 
9 Note that although some states do not have a minimum wage, the Federal minimum wage law supersedes state 
laws.  Several states impose a minimum wage that is higher than the Federal level. 
  10be responsible for much of the variation in the variable.  But the numerator also exhibits 
substantial variation:  Eight states had statutory minimum wages that were higher than the 
Federal level at some time during the sample, and the Federal minimum wage was increased in 
two stages at the end of the sample period—from $4.25 to $4.75 in 1996, and to $5.15 in 1997.  
In addition, some states with minimum wages that were already higher than the Federal level 
raised their minimum wages in stages that were not in synch with the Federal stages.  In all, out 
of 700 observations, our sample has 100 instances of increases in the statutory minimum wage. 
E. Other Policy Variables Not Considered 
  There are policy variables that have appeared in the literature that we do not consider 
here.  For example, Bruce et al. (2004) includes the state sales tax rate, which we have decided to 
exclude.  First, because of the large variation of total sales tax rates within states, due to county 
and city sales taxes on top of state sales taxes, it is it difficult to arrive at a single sales tax rate 
variable.  Second, although the state sales tax rate might serve as a proxy, it varies too little over 
our sample period to be useful.   
  Black and Strahan (2002) estimated the effect of state bank deregulation on 
entrepreneurship over the period 1976-1994, finding statistically significant and large effects for 
the deregulation of branches and of interstate banking.
10  We have not considered bank 
deregulation in this study because most of the deregulation occurred before the start of our 
sample.  Further, as suggested by Wall (2004), Black and Strahan’s results are likely driven by 
the endogeneity of the deregulation process. 
                                                 
10 They differed from most of the literature in defining entrepreneurship as new incorporations. 
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IV. Estimation and Results 
  Using data on entrepreneurship for 1992-1998, we estimate our model with Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and control for state-specific autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.  Although the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients using FGLS do not 
differ substantially from estimates that OLS would provide, the richer error structure allowed for 
by FGLS makes it superior for estimating state panels of entrepreneurship (Georgellis and Wall, 
2006; Wall, 2004).  To avoid issues of simultaneity and to capture the lag between the decision 
to become an entrepreneur and its realization, we use lagged values of all of our independent 
variables.  The reference variables are the adult share of the population aged 18-24, the white 
share of the population, government share of employment, and the year 1992.   
  Our estimation results, summarized in Table 3, indicate that both sets of control variables 
are important for our estimation.  The coefficients on the business environment variables tend to 
be statistically significant, as are many of our demographic variables.  As mentioned above, 
however, only the coefficient on the unemployment rate is easily interpreted.  The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient suggests that the push effects of the unemployment rate 
dominate the pull effects.  Specifically, a one-percentage-point increase in the unemployment 
rate increases the rate of entrepreneurship by about one-eighth of a percentage point, as many 
individuals who are unable to find wage-and-salary employment instead become self-employed.   
  Our estimated year effects suggest that there was a temporal pattern to entrepreneurship 
that was not captured by our other right-hand-side variables.  Even if all variables remained at 
  12their initial levels, entrepreneurship would have risen every year of our sample and would have 
been 1.6 percentage points higher in 1998 than in 1992.  Put another way, 70 percent of the 2.3 
percentage point rise in the average rate of entrepreneurship can be attributed to a common trend. 
  The variables of most interest are the policy variables, and our results suggest that most 
of them are important in determining the level of entrepreneurship.  As reported in Table 3, the 
coefficients on the homestead exemption rate, corporate-income tax rate, and the relative 
minimum wage are all statistically different from zero.  Further, as reported in Table 4, Wald 
tests of the joint significance of these variables indicate that only the personal-income tax rate 
does not have statistically significant effects on the estimation.  The estimated effects of the four 
policy variables on rates of entrepreneurship are illustrated by Figures 4-7.  As these figures 
show, in addition to being statistically significant, these policies also tend to be economically 
significant. 
A. Homestead Exemption Rate 
  As in Fan and White (2003), Berkowitz and White (2004), and Georgellis and Wall 
(2006), we find that the decision to become an entrepreneur is related to the homestead 
exemption.  As Figure 4 illustrates, the relationship between the homestead exemption rate and 
the entrepreneurship rate has the same S-shape found by Georgellis and Wall (2006).  For 
homestead exemption rates between 0 and 22, the credit-access effect dominates the wealth-
insurance effect, meaning that an increase in the homestead exemption should lead to a decrease 
in entrepreneurship.  An increase in the homestead exemption rate from 0 to 22 will lead to a 
  13decrease in the rate of entrepreneurship of just over nine-tenths of a percentage point.  This is 
quite a large effect given that the mean entrepreneurship rate in the sample is 14.6 percent.   
  Beyond a homestead exemption rate of 22 until about 62, the wealth-insurance effect 
dominates the credit-access effect and an increase in the homestead exemption should lead to an 
increase in entrepreneurship.  An increase from 22 to 62 should lead to an increase of about 
seven-tenths of a percentage point in the rate of entrepreneurship.  Beyond a homestead 
exemption rate of 62, further increases in the homestead exemption would tend to reduce the 
number of entrepreneurs.   
  The highest rates of entrepreneurship are attained when the homestead exemption is zero.  
This is in contrast to previous research, which found that an increase in the homestead exemption 
would lead to an increase in entrepreneurship for all starting levels.  We find that this is true only 
within some ranges of the homestead exemption. 
B. Personal-Income Tax 
  Although the maximum personal-income tax variable is not statistically significant, our 
point estimates do suggest the same U-shaped relationship between it and the rate of 
entrepreneurship found by Georgellis and Wall (2006).  As seen in Figure 5, at lower tax rates 
the labor-supply effect dominates, but at higher tax rates the tax-avoidance effect dominates.  It 
is clear from the vertical scale of the figure, however, that even if these effects were statistically 
significant, they would have very little economic significance.  The highest and lowest rates of 
entrepreneurship along the curve differ by only about 0.08 percentage points.  This failure to find 
a relationship between the rate of personal-income tax and state-level entrepreneurship is 
  14consistent with Bruce et al. (2004).  Left unanswered by our results, however, is whether there is 
a relationship between entrepreneurship and the structure of the personal-income tax system as 
suggested by Bruce et al. (2004), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), and Cullen and Gordon (2002). 
C. Corporate-Income Tax 
  Unlike the personal-income tax rate, the corporate-income tax rate appears to have very 
large effects on entrepreneurship, as seen in Figure 6.  Up to the highest rate in our sample, an 
increase in the maximum corporate-income tax rate will push more people out of 
entrepreneurship than it will push into it by reducing opportunities for wage-and-salary 
employment at corporations.  The effect of the corporate-income tax rate can be substantial.  All 
else equal, a state that does not levy a tax on corporate income will tend to have a rate of 
entrepreneurship that is about 0.9 percentage points higher than a state that levies a maximum 
corporate-income tax rate of 12 percent.
11
D. Minimum Wage 
  Our fourth policy variable, the minimum wage relative to productivity, is negatively 
related to the rate of entrepreneurship.
12  This relationship is illustrated by Figure 7.  All else 
equal, a state with a relative minimum wage of 0.29 will have a rate of entrepreneurship that is 
eight-tenths of a percentage point lower than a state that has a relative minimum wage of 0.14.  
                                                 
11 In contrast, in their time-series study of aggregate rates of entrepreneurship, Bruce and Mohsin (2003) find that 
the effect of the maximum federal corporate-income tax rate is statistically significant but small. 
12 Bruce and Mohsin (2003) find that changes in the real federal minimum wage have been related to changes in the 
aggregate rate of entrepreneurship over time.  Their minimum wage variable differs from ours in that it does not 
account for changes in productivity. 
 
  15These results suggest that a reduction in the federal minimum wage would increase 
entrepreneurship across states.  They also point out how the federal minimum wage hits poorer 
states especially hard.  Entrepreneurs in these states, where productivity is lowest, are required to 
pay the same level of minimum wage as in the richest states, even though workers with the 
corresponding level of productivity to warrant being paid the minimum wage are more difficult 
to find.  Consequently, all else equal, in the relatively poor states the federal minimum wage 
results in fewer entrepreneurs and fewer of the benefits that entrepreneurship can bring.  Of 
course, an increase in the productivity of the workforce, perhaps through improved education, 
would also lower a state’s relative minimum wage and bring about a higher rate of 
entrepreneurship.  
 
V. Geographic Variation in the Effects of the Policy Environment 
  The significant cross-state variation in policies summarized by Table 2 means that there 
were significant cross-state differences in the effects of government policies on levels of 
entrepreneurship.  Our estimates of the percentage effects of the policies for each state are in 
Table 5:  The first column is the percentage difference in the number of entrepreneurs because 
the homestead exemption is not zero, the second column is the percentage difference because the 
corporate-income tax is not zero, and the third column is the percentage difference because the 
state’s relative minimum wage differs from the lowest among the states.  The final column is the 
total effect of the three policies on the number of entrepreneurs.  The total effects of the policy 
environment range from the 2.7, 2.8, and 4.2 percent decreases for Texas, Nevada, and Wyoming 
  16to the 15.3, 15.4, and 19.4 percent decreases for Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.  
The average across all states was a 10.2 percent decrease. 
  As Figure 8 illustrates, there is a geographic pattern to the effects of the policy 
environment on the number of entrepreneurs:  The states with the least-friendly policies for 
entrepreneurs are located almost exclusively in the eastern half of the country, with Southern and 
Great Lakes states prominent.  Note that Figure 8 is nearly a negative image of Figures 1 and 2: 
the least-entrepreneurial states tend to also be the states with the worst policy environments for 
entrepreneurs.  More specifically, the Spearman rank correlation between the levels of 
entrepreneurship and the effect of the policy environment is -0.578, which is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.   
  Although there is a strong correlation between the levels of entrepreneurship and the 
policy environment, this explains only part of the regional pattern illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 
(see Table 6).  For the 15 least-entrepreneurial states, the seven located in the South had average 
policy effects of -13.9 percent, which is somewhat higher than the average policy effect of -12.6 
percent for the Northern subset of these states.  Among the less-entrepreneurial states, therefore, 
policy contributions to the rates of entrepreneurship were not terribly important in explaining 
regional variations.  
  For the 11 most-entrepreneurial states, on the other hand, the regional differences in 
policy are more pointed:  The three New England states had policy environments that were 
substantially less friendly to entrepreneurs than were those of the entrepreneurial states of the 
West.  The average effect of the policy environment in the New England states was -10.7 
  17percent, which is actually larger in absolute terms than the cross-state average.  The Western 
states, however, were much friendlier to entrepreneurs, having an average policy effect of  
-7.4.  Thus, while a good portion of the Western states’ primacy in entrepreneurship was due to 
their policy environment, the high rates of entrepreneurship in New England states was achieved 
despite their relatively unfriendly policy environments. 
  Table 7 provides further evidence of the potential importance of a state’s policy 
environment in determining its rate of entrepreneurship.  The first column shows for the 15 least-
entrepreneurial states the percentage-point gap between the state’s rate of entrepreneurship and 
the average rate of entrepreneurship.  The second column indicates the relative importance of the 
policy environment in determining the state’s entrepreneurship gap.  It is the ratio of the state’s 
entrepreneurship gap to the percentage-point effect of the state’s policy environment on its rate 
of entrepreneurship.  The policy environments account for between 37 and 95 percent of the 
entrepreneurship gaps for these states.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
  We find that corporate-income tax rates, bankruptcy law, and minimum wage legislation 
all have statistically and economically significant effects on rates of entrepreneurship across U.S. 
states.  These results highlight that in terms of government policy, the greatest gains in 
entrepreneurship can be had by reducing government-imposed burdens on entrepreneurs and 
other businesses.  These gains in entrepreneurship likely dwarf those that can be attained by 
direct intervention (i.e., subsidies or tax breaks) aimed at individual entrepreneurs or businesses. 
  18    We find that the geographic pattern of entrepreneurship is similar to the geographic 
pattern of policy environments.  The low-entrepreneurship states of the Great Lakes and the 
South tend to have relatively unfriendly policy environments.  Similarly, the high-
entrepreneurship states of the West tend to have relatively friendly policies.  On the other hand, 
although New England states tend to have relatively unfriendly policy environments, they also 
tend to have high rates of entrepreneurship.  
 
  19Table 1A.  Data Sources 
 
Data series  Source 
Non-farm proprietors’ employment, 
total non-farm employment 
Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Table CA25 
Unemployment rate  Household Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Dividends, interest, and rent  Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Table CA05 
Per capita gross state product  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Average non-farm proprietors’ 
income; average wage and salary 
disbursements 
Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Table CA30 
Industry employment shares; age, 
race, and sex employment shares 
Establishment Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Maximum marginal tax rates  TAXSIM, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Maximum corporate tax rate  Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 
various editions 
Minimum wage  “State Labor Legislation Enacted in 199X,” Monthly 
Labor Review, various issues, 1990-1998. 
Homestead bankruptcy exemptions  Elias, Renauer, and Leonard, How to File for Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy, various editions 
Median house price  Derived using median house price from 1990 Census 
and the Home Price Index from the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight 
Home ownership rate, median house 
price, metro population, total 
population 
Census Bureau 
Share of households with householder 
and spouse 
Census Bureau, derived from 1990 and 2000 Census 
assuming constant state-level rates of change 
 
  









Rate  of  Entrepreneurship  14.61 2.91 21.56 9.66 
Homestead Exemption Rate  28.67  24.72  75.40  0.00 
Max. Personal-Income Tax Rate  38.37  4.07  44.87  28.00 
Max. Corporate-Income Tax Rate  6.09  2.85  12.25  0.00 
Minimum Wage Relative to Productivity 0.20  0.03  0.29  0.14 
Unemployment  Rate  5.76  1.54 11.40 2.50 
Real Income Per Capita  21.25  3.68  35.95  13.38 
Relative Proprietor’s Wage  0.74  0.11  1.05  0.51 
Real Wealth Per Capita  4.13  0.84  6.99  2.30 
Real Median House Price  59.93  21.40  147.59  31.37 
Ag. services, forestry, fishing  1.50  0.73  5.74  0.70 
Mining  6.58  1.06 10.04 4.49 
Construction  8.39  1.70 14.94 5.54 
Manufacturing  15.21 5.56 27.43 3.51 
Transportation and public utilities  1.12  1.70  10.10  0.03 
Wholesale trade  20.98  1.72  24.98  16.61 
Retail trade  35.00  3.94  50.52  26.84 
Finance, insurance, and real estate  5.87  1.13  10.49  3.56 
Services 5.34  0.89  7.75  3.44 
Share of Population in Metro Areas  67.63  20.35  100.00  29.62 
Adult Share Aged 45-65  26.73  1.51  31.49  22.36 
Adult Share Aged 65+  17.16  2.55  24.31  6.23 
Female Share of Employment  46.16  1.31  49.25  41.63 
Black Share of Employment  9.93  9.36  36.37  0.31 
Native American Share of Employment  1.66  2.94  16.05  0.13 
Asian Share of Employment  3.15  8.73  63.30  0.44 
Hispanic Share of Employment  5.98  7.92  39.95  0.47 
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 Table 1. State Rates of Entrepreneurship, 1990 and 2000 
State 1990  2000  Change 
Alabama 10.0 12.6 2.6
Alaska  19.4 18.8 -0.5 
Arizona  13.4 17.6  4.1 
Arkansas  12.1 15.1  3.0 
California  14.7 17.5  2.9 
Colorado  17.8 21.7  3.9 
Connecticut  14.0 16.8  2.8 
Delaware  11.1 13.7  2.6 
Florida  12.6 15.2  2.7 
Georgia  10.5 13.9  3.4 
Hawaii  14.2 15.5  1.2 
Idaho  17.6 19.7  2.2 
Illinois  11.6 13.8  2.2 
Indiana  11.3 13.1  1.8 
Iowa  14.3 16.6  2.3 
Kansas  15.4 16.6  1.2 
Kentucky  10.5 12.4  1.9 
Louisiana  10.3 12.6  2.2 
Maine  16.2 20.1  3.8 
Maryland  12.4 14.2  1.8 
Massachusetts  12.4 16.3  3.9 
Michigan  10.8 12.7  1.9 
Minnesota  14.1 16.1  2.1 
Mississippi  9.7 12.4 2.7 
Missouri  12.9 15.3  2.4 
Montana  18.3 21.4  3.2 
Nebraska  15.3 17.0  1.8 
Nevada  12.8 17.7  4.9 
New Hampshire  15.9 18.7  2.7 
New Jersey  11.8 13.0  1.2 
New Mexico  13.0 15.6  2.6 
New York  10.5 13.1  2.6 
North Carolina  11.7 14.7  3.0 
North Dakota  14.4 17.9  3.5 
Ohio  10.7 13.1  2.3 
Oklahoma  15.8 17.1  1.2 
Oregon  15.9 17.6  1.7 
Pennsylvania  12.0 13.1  1.1 
Rhode Island  11.2 13.1  1.9 
South Carolina  9.7 11.9 2.3 
South Dakota  16.5 19.6  3.1 
Tennessee  12.5 16.0  3.5 
Texas  15.1 16.7  1.7 
Utah  16.0 19.2  3.1 
Vermont  18.3 21.4  3.1 
Virginia  11.2 12.7  1.4 
Washington  15.1 15.1  0.0 
West Virginia  10.2 11.4  1.2 
Wisconsin  11.6 13.2  1.6 
Wyoming  18.8 19.9  1.1 
Mean 13.5 15.8 2.3
St. dev.  2.7 2.8 1.0 
 













Alabama $5,000 3.12 5 0.23 
Alaska 54,000  0 5.2 0.16 
Arizona 100,000  4.8  9 0.21 
Arkansas no  limit 7  3.75 0.25 
California 7,500  9.78  9.3 0.18 
Colorado 20,000  5.36  5 0.21 
Connecticut 0  4.5 11.25 0.16 
Delaware 0  6.9  8.7 0.15 
Florida no  limit  0 5.5 0.21 
Georgia 5,000  5.83  6 0.20 
Hawaii 30,000  9 5.4 0.20 
Idaho 30,000  8.2  8 0.25 
Illinois 7,500  3  4.8 0.18 
Indiana 7,500  3.4  3.4 0.22 
Iowa no  limit  6.36  9 0.23 
Kansas no  limit  6.45 4 0.24 
Kentucky 5,000 6  6.13 0.22 
Louisiana 15,000  3.75  6 0.19 
Maine 7,500  8.5  6.22 0.25 
Maryland 0 6 7 0.19 
Massachusetts 100,000  5.95  9.5 0.18 
Michigan 3,500  4.4 1.15 0.20 
Minnesota no  limit 8.86  9.8 0.21 
Mississippi 30,000  4.85  4 0.25 
Missouri 8,000 6 6.25 0.22 
Montana 40,000  6.83  6.75 0.29 
Nebraska 10,000 7  6.7 0.24 
Nevada 90,000  0  0 0.19 
New Hampshire  5,000  0  7 0.20 
New Jersey  0  6.37  9 0.15 
New Mexico  20,000  8.4  6.2 0.20 
New York  10,000  6.85  9 0.15 
North Carolina  7,500  8.08  7.75 0.22 
North Dakota  80,000  5.25  6.75 0.28 
Ohio 5,000  7.2  7 0.21 
Oklahoma no  limit 6.05  6 0.25 
Oregon 15,000  9 6.6 0.21 
Pennsylvania 0  2.8  10 0.20 
Rhode Island  0  9.66  9 0.20 
South Carolina  5,000  7.3  5 0.23 
South Dakota  no limit  0  0 0.26 
Tennessee 5,000  0  6 0.22 
Texas no  limit  0 0 0.19 
Utah 8,000  5.72  5 0.24 
Vermont 30,000  8.85  6.88 0.25 
Virginia 5,000  5.75 6 0.20 
Washington 30,000  0  0 0.20 
West Virginia  7,500  6.5  9 0.23 
Wisconsin 40,000 6.93  7.9 0.23 
Wyoming 10,000  0  0 0.18 
 Table 3. Regression Results – Entrepreneurship and the Policy Environment  
 Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-statistic 
Policy Environment   
Homestead Exemption Rate  -0.096* 0.022 -4.33
Homestead Exemption Rate Squared  0.003* 0.001 3.81
Homestead Exemption Rate Cubed  -0.00002* 0.00001 -3.65
Max. Personal-Income Tax Rate  -0.037  0.054 -0.70
Max. Personal-Income Tax Rate Squared  0.001  0.001 0.79
Max. Corporate-Income Tax Rate  -0.138* 0.082 -1.68
Max. Corporate-Income Tax Rate Squared  0.005  0.006 0.90
Min. Wage Relative to Productivity  -5.661* 2.091 -2.71
Business Environment         
Unemployment Rate  0.120* 0.022 5.53
Real Income Per Capita  -0.162* 0.091 -1.77
Relative Proprietor’s Wage  0.163  0.380 0.43
Real Wealth Per Capita  0.150  0.243 0.62
Real Median House Price  0.027* 0.008 3.44
Industry Shares  yes     
Demographics        
Share of Population in Metro Areas  -0.174* 0.063 -2.77
Adult Share Aged 45-65  0.102* 0.049 2.06
Adult Share Aged 65+  0.318* 0.097 3.26
Female Share of Employment  0.052* 0.019 2.72
Black Share of Employment  0.063  0.098 0.64
Native American Share of Employment -0.142* 0.309 -0.46
Asian Share of Employment  -0.104  0.193 -0.54
Hispanic Share of Employment  0.040  0.067 0.60
Year Effects         
1993 0.088  0.073 1.21
1994 0.352* 0.103 3.41
1995 0.701* 0.134 5.24
1996 1.139* 0.162 7.03
1997 1.374* 0.191 7.19
1998 1.631* 0.224 7.29
State Fixed Effects  yes     
Note: The FGLS estimation corrects for state-specific heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.   A ‘*’ 
indicates significance at the 10 percent level or higher. Number of observations = 350.  The dependent 
variable is the rate of entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Table 4. Wald Tests of the Joint Significance of Policy Variables 
Policy Variable (n)  ) (
2 n χ  Prob  >   ) (
2 n χ
Homestead Exemption (3)  21.97  0.0001 
Personal-Income Tax Rate (2)  1.84  0.3981 
Corporate-Income Tax Rate (2) 5.61  0.0606 
 
 Table 5. Effects of Policy Environment on Entrepreneurship, 1998  







of the min. wage Total 
Alabama -5.0  -4.8 -3.7 -13.4 
Alaska  -4.2 -2.7 -0.2 -7.0 
Arizona  -1.4 -5.5 -2.1 -9.1 
Arkansas  -1.8 -3.1 -3.8 -8.6 
California  -4.1 -4.9 -0.8 -9.7 
Colorado  -4.5 -2.7 -1.6 -8.8 
Connecticut  -5.0 -5.5 -0.1  -10.6 
Delaware    0.0  -6.6    0.0  -6.6 
Florida  -1.9 -4.2 -2.3 -8.4 
Georgia  -3.9 -5.1 -2.0  -11.0 
Hawaii  -3.9 -3.5 -1.6 -9.1 
Idaho  -1.4 -4.0 -3.0 -8.4 
Illinois  -4.3 -4.1 -1.3 -9.7 
Indiana  -5.9 -3.2 -3.0  -12.1 
Iowa  -2.6 -5.0 -2.8  -10.4 
Kansas  -1.5 -2.8 -2.9 -7.2 
Kentucky  -5.2 -5.4 -3.3  -13.9 
Louisiana  -6.4 -5.3 -1.6  -13.3 
Maine  -4.7 -3.5 -3.0  -11.2 
Maryland    0.0  -5.0  -1.6  -6.7 
Massachusetts  -4.5 -5.5 -1.2  -11.2 
Michigan  -7.5 -1.2 -2.1  -10.8 
Minnesota  -3.5 -5.3 -2.2  -10.9 
Mississippi  -4.2 -4.1 -4.7  -13.1 
Missouri  -3.8 -4.5 -2.7  -11.0 
Montana  -2.1 -3.2 -3.6 -8.9 
Nebraska  -5.1 -4.2 -2.9  -12.2 
Nevada  -1.4    0.0  -1.4  -2.8 
New Hampshire  -5.1 -4.0 -1.5  -10.6 
New Jersey  -5.0  -6.5    0.0  -11.5 
New Mexico  -5.1 -4.2 -1.9  -11.1 
New York  -3.6  -6.4    0.0  -10.0 
North Carolina  -5.7 -5.5 -2.5  -13.7 
North Dakota  -1.7 -4.1 -4.2  -10.0 
Ohio  -3.8 -5.5 -2.5  -11.8 
Oklahoma  -1.7 -3.7 -3.1 -8.6 
Oregon  -4.4 -3.8 -1.8  -10.0 
Pennsylvania  -6.9 -6.5 -2.0  -15.4 
Rhode Island  -5.7 -6.5 -2.0  -14.2 
South Carolina  -4.7 -4.8 -3.9  -13.4 
South Dakota  -1.5    0.0  -3.1  -4.6 
Tennessee  -2.5 -4.2 -2.7 -9.4 
Texas  -1.3    0.0  -1.3  -2.7 
Utah  -2.0 -3.1 -2.6 -7.7 
Vermont  -4.0 -3.5 -2.9  -10.5 
Virginia  -3.4 -5.0 -2.1  -10.5 
Washington  -5.8    0.0  -1.6  -7.4 
West Virginia  -8.0 -7.4 -4.0  -19.4 
Wisconsin  -6.4 -5.8 -3.1  -15.3 









Table 6. Policy Environments of the Least- and  
Most-Entrepreneurial States and Regions 
 
Average Effect of 
Policy Environment 
Bottom 15          -13.2 
     South (7)  -13.9 
     North (8)  -12.6 
Top 11           -8.3 
     New England (3)  -10.7 

















West Virginia   4.3  50.5 
Mississippi   4.1  36.7 
South Carolina   3.7  43.1 
Alabama   3.6  43.2 
Kentucky   3.4  48.9 
Louisiana   3.3  48.3 
Michigan   3.1  42.4 
Rhode Island   2.7  67.3 
Virginia   2.7  50.2 
New Jersey   2.6  55.2 
New York   2.5  51.6 
Ohio   2.5  61.6 
Indiana   2.5  63.6 
Wisconsin   2.1  94.5 
a The difference between the mean rate of entrepreneurship 
and the state’s actual rate of entrepreneurship for 1998.   
b The ratio of the gap and the percentage-point effect of the 
policy environment on the rate of entrepreneurship. 
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Figure 1. Rates of Entrepreneurship, 1990
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Figure 3. Changes in Entrepreneurship, 1990-2000 
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Figure 8. Effects of Policy Environment, 1998 
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